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Abstract 
 
This paper endeavors to explore the roles that institutional investors play in acquisition decision 
of Chinese Public Listed Companies (PLCs). Acquisition decision is assumed as a cost-benefit 
analysis process of shareholders as strategic alliances. Using micro data in the Chinese stock 
market during 2003-2008, we find that institutional investors including Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors (QFII), Social Security Funds (SSF), Security Firms (SF) and Security 
Investment Funds (SIF), as well as tradable share (TS) concentration affect a PLC’s acquisition 
likelihood rather than its annual acquisition size. SSF, SIF and TS concentration can increase 
acquisition likelihood while QFII decrease it. This paper suggests a strategic alliance model in 
which institutional investors choose whether to coordinate with controlling shareholder and 
management. Our paper contributes to the published literature in three ways. First, we offer a 
conceptual framework to understand the coordination process of acquisition decision in China. 
Second, we identify which institutional investors could benefit from their monitoring on corporate 
acquisition through better post-acquisition performance and which could not. Third, we investigate 
whether institutional investors effectively monitor acquisiton decision or just pick cherry. 
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1. Introduction 
Institutional ownership of ordinary shares has increased substantially over the past 10 years in the 
Chinese stock market. In the early stages of capital market development in the 1990s, the total 
shares were divided into a major part of non-tradable share (NTS) and a minor part of tradable 
share (TS) in China.1 The controlling shareholder of a Chinese Public Listed Companies (PLC) 
is the largest NTS owners and used to be a government organisation or a State-Owned enterprise 
(SOE). Hence, institutional investors of Chinese PLCs could only held less than 10% value of the 
TS market in 2003 (Zeng, Yuan, & Zhang, 2011) when institutional investors such as Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII), Social Security Funds (SSF) and Security Investment Funds 
(SIF) were allowed to be founded by law.  
The controlling NTS shareholders could misappropriate the assets and harm the interests of 
minor TS shareholders through such channels as dividend appropriation (Chen, Jian, & Xu, 2009), 
loans to controlling shareholder (Jiang, Lee, & Yue, 2010) and mergers & acquisitions (Chen & 
Young, 2010). In order to solve these problems, the Chinese government launched the split share 
structure reform in 2005 to compensate TS shareholders and allow all shares to be tradable (Firth, 
Lin, & Zou, 2010). Until 2008, institutional investors had held about 60% of the TS share, as a 
total of 1,254 Chinese PLCs had accomplished the split share structure reform, representing over 
97% of the Chinese A-share market capitalization (Li, Wang, Cheung, & Jiang, 2011; Zeng et al., 
2011). 
At the same time, acquisitions of Chinese PLCs, as the large and visible corporate 
investments, have become a very important phenomenon in the Chinese stock market (Peng, Kang, 
& Jiang, 2013). With the potential for wide disparity between shareholder and manager interests, 
the total acquisition size of Chinese PLCs had increased more than 5 folds from 50 billion RMB 
                                                             
1 In this split share structure, NTS cannot be traded in the capital market, while all else is equal with TS (Hu, Tam, & 
Tan, 2010; Zeng, Yuan, & Zhang, 2011). The TS comprise A-shares, denominated in RMB and traded in the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges; and H-shares, listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Lee, Rui, & Wu, 2008; Lee, 
2009). We focus on the Chinese A-share in this paper. 
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Yuan in 2003 to 277 billion RMB Yuan in 2008 (see Table 1). Since both acquisition and 
institutional ownership have become important agendas of corporate management in China, the 
coincidence of their fast development naturally arouses a very interesting question: Whether or 
how institutional investors monitor the acquisition decision of the Chinese PLCs? 
Researchers like Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Cheng, Huang, Li, and Lobo (2010) argue 
that institutional investors play an important monitoring role in corporate governance. 
Theoretically, institutions face the choice between exerting monitoring effort on acquisition for 
shared gains versus simply trading for private gains (Kahn & Winton, 1998; Maug, 1998; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1986). While institutions could focus on improving acquisition performance and choose 
not to expend effort on trading, Qiu (2008) shows that public pension funds (PPF) are associated 
with reduced frequency of merger bids. Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) argue that institutional 
investors with high-turnover portfolios exert little influence on managers with regard to 
acquisition decisions. Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) point out that only concentrated holdings by 
independent long-term institutions (ILTI) are related to post-acquisition performance, the presence 
of which also makes withdrawal of bad bids more likely. Thus, empirical works in literature have 
been mixed on the effects of institutional ownership on a firm’s acquisition decision. 
Moreover, these studies are mainly on the capital markets of developed countries especially 
the USA, which are characterized by diffused corporate ownership and a high level of investor 
protection, and the main agency problem is the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
executive managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Most emerging capital 
markets, however, are characterized by concentrated ownership and poor investor protection, 
which shifts the main agency problem to conflicts of interest between majority and minority 
shareholders (Hu et al., 2010; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Young, Peng, 
Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Meyer (2004) doubts whether institutional investors have the 
necessary power, incentives and capabilities to monitor the corporate governance of PLCs in a 
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transition economy, even though dispersed ownership and indirect control structures may provide 
many shareholders with formal rights to monitor firms. Zeng, Yuan, and Zhang (2011) suggest 
that institutional investors in China be more likely to collude rather than fight against the 
controlling shareholder and exacerbate the agency problem between majority and minority 
shareholders, that is, principal-principal conflict (Chen & Young, 2010). Hence, the different roles 
of institutional investors in an emerging market like China are of great interest both theoretically 
and in practice. 
This paper investigates institutional influences on acquisition decision using an unbalanced 
dataset of 1,438 PLCs with 7,458 company-years over the period 2003-2008 of the split share 
structure reform in China. This dataset has provided unique societal quasi-experiments to test the 
applicability of existing theories of institutional monitoring on the acquisition decision. Our paper 
contributes to the published literature in three ways. First, we provide a conceptual framework of 
coordination under uncertainty to investigate whether and how institutional investors could 
effectively monitor corporate acquisition decision. We find that institutional investors have no 
significant effect on the ex-post decisions of management on accurate annual acquisition size, but 
can affect the likelihood of acquisition. And, outsider independent institutions could be more 
cautious and decrease the likelihood of acquisition, while insider interdependent institutions opt 
for coordination with the controlling shareholder and increase the likelihood. These results would 
not change when we truncate or censor the data. 
Second, we relate our measures of institutional presence to the post-acquisition performance 
measures: changes in return on assets (DROA) and earnings per share (DEPS). We find results are 
broadly consistent with institutional monitoring literature. Specifically, the presence of large 
holdings by institutions such as Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) and Security 
Investment Funds (SIF), which held more than 25% value of the TS market in 2008 (Zeng, Yuan, 
& Zhang, 2011), predicting better post-acquisition performance from monitoring effort. Third, we 
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conduct the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell (FWL) 2-Step model (Frisch & Waugh, 1933; Lovell, 1963) to 
test the “cherry-picking” effect of institutional investment on acquiring PLCs, which increase our 
confidence in the monitoring hypothesis. 
Our results shed new light on the institutional investor activism in acquisition decision of 
Chinese PLCs. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The next section presents a review 
of the relevant literature and develops the hypotheses; This is followed by a discussion of the 
methodology used in the study along with the sample selection; We then present the results of the 
empirical test in section 4; and the implications of the findings along with limitations and potential 
avenues for future studies are in the last section. 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
2.1 Uncertainty in acquisition decision 
Acquisition decisions, like other major strategic decisions, involve complexity, ambiguity and lack 
of structure (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985). As strategic alliances within the same organisation, the 
controlling shareholder, management and the institutional investors cannot simultaneously 
consider or process information of acquisition. Hence, neither shareholders nor management can 
have perfect information on potential acquisition offers, optimal acquisition size and post-
acquisition performance.  
In Figure 1, we postulate an acquisition market which offers the stocks and assets for 
acquisitions randomly following a normal distribution. The management searches the potential 
acquisition offers in the market and matches them with the effective acquisition demand (ADit) of 
the Chinese PLC i in year t, which is contingent upon its financial and governance characteristics 
(Deng, 2012, 2013). Uncertainty of acquisition market may cause decision-making biases of 
alliance partners and possibly fail the alliance and acquisition proposal. In order to function in an 
acquisition market with high uncertainty, as well as to avoid the stress that such ambiguity 
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produces, the controlling shareholder may use perceptual process or heuristics to simplify 
information processing and leave the search and match of acquisition on management’s discretion 
(Peng, Kang, & Jiang, 2013). High uncertainty in the acquisition market also makes the controlling 
shareholder difficult, if not impossible to efficiently monitor the ex post acquisition enforcement 
of the management. The controlling shareholder has to judge the optimal size of acquisition 
through gradually learning the acquisition market. In long run, the rational expectation on 
corporate acquisition should be equilibrated to its effective acquisition demand based on its 
financial resources and institutional governance, but irrelevant to ownership structure. Thus, we 
have the first hypothesis as follows:  
 
H1: The management searches and matches the random acquisition offers in the market with the 
effective corporate demand. At a long run equilibrium, the corporate acquisition is only contingent 
upon corporate finance and governance, but irrelevant to its ownership structure. It is the “right 
to manage” hypothesis.  
  
The management, however, possibly chooses the acquisition proposals to maximize their 
own interest such as higher Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation and more power (Kang 
& Peng, 2014) rather than maximize shareholders’ capital return, suggesting an agency problem 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). As the management presents the annual 
acquisition proposal at the board meeting, the controlling and institutional shareholders could say 
either yes or no according to their information structure, expected return and optimal strategies. 
Acquisition happens if and only if the controlling shareholder agrees with the annual acquisition 
proposal. And then, the institutional shareholders would choose to coordinate with the controlling 
shareholder or just vote with their feet. Hence, the controlling shareholder has to consider 
responses of both management and institutional shareholders when the acquisition decision is 
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made.  
In a transition economy like China, more than 70% of the controlling shareholders of PLCs 
are SOEs (Peng, Kang, & Jiang, 2013). It suggests a two-tier corporate governance system of 
supervisory and managerial functions. The top board directors are usually ownership 
representatives of controlling SOEs rather than the traditional individual/family owners of the 
PLCs. Hence, board directors, as representatives of ownership, have to play the supervisory and 
executive roles in acquisition decision. When the management holds shares, the negative 
influences of the principal-agent conflicts would be alleviated. With the separation of the CEO 
and the chairman of board, the monitoring of shareholders is more efficient than the CEO duality. 
Hence, the management’s acquisition selection should be more cautious (Peng, Li, Xie, & Su, 
2010). The second hypothesis is presented as follows: 
 
H2: The board directors supervise and finally decide the CEO’s acquisition proposals. The 
management shareholding and separation of CEO and board chairman could make the 
management’s acquisition selection more cautious. It is the “right to supervise” hypothesis.  
 
Furthermore, the high level uncertainty of acquisition decision tempts the major 
shareholders (and the board directors) to find strategic alliances and share the risk. The 
management has better knowledge of acquisition market and corporate resources. The collusion 
between the major shareholder(s) and the management is widely observed in Chinese PLCs (Zeng, 
Yuan, & Zhang, 2011). The acquisition proposals are actually designed to reflect the joint interest 
of major shareholder(s) and the management so that saying yes to the management’s proposal is 
the dominant strategy of the controlling shareholder (see Figure 1). Institutional shareholders, 
especially holding small stakes and without interdependent business relation, are in the even worse 
information position than the controlling shareholder, because they join the PLC, or attend the 
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board only in recent years (mostly after 2003), and could have more interest conflicts with major 
shareholder(s) and management. The principal-principal conflicts between the major and 
institutional shareholders may be the main agency problem in Chinese stock market (Chen & 
Young, 2010). If the colluded management and major shareholder(s) were at the same one end of 
the interest balance, the institutional and minor shareholders could be at the other end. The more 
concentrated is the shareholding, the easier are the management and major shareholder(s) to 
collude in acquisition decision and harm the interests of other shareholders (Chen & Young, 2010). 
Without efficient monitoring, these acquisition proposals are more likely to be overconfident and 
bring bad post-acquisition performance. Therefore, we have the third hypothesis:  
 
H3: The more concentrated is the ownership structure, the more likely are the major shareholder(s) 
and management strategic alliances pro-overconfident acquisition with bad post-acquisition 
performance. It is the “right to ally” hypothesis.  
 
2.2 Monitoring, Trading and Coordination game  
In Figure 1, the decision process of acquisition is depicted as a “coordination game” between 
controlling shareholder and institutional investors. We assume that the management and 
controlling shareholder have initially presented the annual acquisition proposal at the board 
meeting. The institutional shareholders have a cost–benefit analysis of monitoring versus trading. 
Monitoring calls for both information gathering and efforts to influence controlling shareholder 
and management, while trading also need gather information and pay transaction cost. Chen, 
Harford, and Li (2007) argue that monitoring is distinguished from trading by the type of 
information gathered (in the view of long-term versus short-term interest). And, monitoring makes 
the effort to influence controlling shareholder and management rather than to simply trade on that 
information. Hence, an institutional investor that chooses to monitor is taking an active role in 
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governance but a passive trading position, while institutions that choose not to monitor can be 
active traders but are passive in firm governance. In the following, we establish a framework of 
the costs-benefit analysis of monitoring, trading and the coordination, from which we develop 
specific hypotheses. 
Following Bushee (1998) and Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), we classify institutions into 
four groups by the stake holding size and the interdependence relationship with the controlling 
shareholder and management: 1) The insider large institutions; 2) The outsider large institutions; 
3) The insider small institutions; 4) The outsider small institutions.2 We argue that monitoring 
costs decrease with the size of the institutional stake. As long as there is a fixed component to the 
cost of gathering and analysing information, there will be economies of scale in monitoring. The 
larger the holdings of an institution, the smaller will be the proportional cost of monitoring. In fact, 
larger holdings can reduce the total costs of monitoring by giving the institution easier access to 
management and the board. Institutions with large stake in the Chinese PLCs will have naturally 
lower monitoring cost functions. On the other hand, monitoring benefits include the ability to 
influence management, the potential financial gains from executing such influence, and better 
information. We argue that monitoring benefits increase with the size of the investment stake. The 
larger its stake in the firm, the more influence it will have with management and the larger will be 
the financial benefit to the institution from successfully influencing management. Thus, these 
institutions with large stakes will specialize in monitoring.  
Moreover, the information gathering and transaction costs of trading increase with the size 
of the stake in the firm. As the size of the stake increase, trading costs increase while monitoring 
                                                             
2 Bushee (1998) classifies institutions into three groups: dedicated, quasi-indexer, and transient, based on their past 
investment patterns in the areas of portfolio turnover, diversification, and momentum trading. While transient 
institutions are not expected to exert effort to influence managers, dedicated institutions are likely to perform the full 
monitoring role of gathering information and attempting to influence managers. A priori, it is uncertain whether quasi-
indexers will attempt to perform monitoring functions. Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) define monitoring measure by 
intersecting ILTIs with those identified by Bushee’s method as dedicated and quasi-indexer investors. They identifies 
institutions with investment styles suited to monitoring activities and that also have a sufficiently long relationship 
with the acquiring firm to have the potential to influence managers.  
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costs decrease and benefits increase, such that the net benefits of monitoring will usually dominate 
those of trading for institutions with large stakes. The monitoring of institutional shareholders on 
acquisition could decrease the uncertainty of acquisition decision and influence the final 
acquisition decision of the controlling shareholder. The benefit of institutional monitoring will be 
shared with the controlling shareholder and management through increasing the post-acquisition 
performance of the acquiring PLC. Following Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), we hypothesize 
institutional investors that have maintained large stakes in a firm will specialize in monitoring 
activities, while other institutional investors may trade instead of monitoring. Hence, monitoring 
institutions will benefit through their monitoring efforts, but at least some of this benefit will be 
shared with other stockholders. Based on the above arguments, we have the following hypothesis 
about institutional monitoring and trading: 
 
H4: Institutions with large stakes prefer monitoring and could increase the post-acquisition 
performance, while institutions with small stakes prefer trading and could have less positive effect 
on the post-acquisition performance. It is the “right to choose” hypothesis. 
 
The coordination of shareholders is at the core of acquisition decision in Chinese PLCs. 
Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) argue that some institutional investors (e.g., trust departments 
of bank) might want to protect existing or potential business relationships with firms and are 
therefore less willing to challenge the joint decisions of the controlling shareholder and 
management. In Chinese stock market, Security Investment Funds (SIF) and Social Security Funds 
(SSF) are usually state owned as most controlling shareholders, so are often regarded as insider 
institutional investors. Insider institutions face high costs of coordination failures of acquisition 
decision. They could avoid damaging their relationship with controlling shareholder and 
management, and losing existing or potential business. Insider institutions have very similar 
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information structure and interests to the controlling shareholder and management. Hence, they 
are more likely to be coordinated with the controlling shareholder and management on the 
acquisition decision.  
In contrast, institutions such as Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) and Security 
Firms (SF) are private or foreign owned. They do not seek business relationships with the firms in 
which they invest, so are often regarded as outsider institutional investors in China. For outsider 
institutions, however, they may face considerable information and interest gaps because only 
gradually Chinese PLCs involve outsider shareholders into their strategic management and publish 
relevant information to them (Meyer, 2004). Outsider institutions without potential business ties 
face high costs of coordination and more likely to disagree the acquisition decision. Hence, we 
have hypothesis about insider/outsider institutions as follows: 
 
H5: Insider institutions are more likely to be coordinated with the controlling shareholder and 
management than outsider institutions. There is a positive association between insider 
institutional shareholders and acquisition decision, vice versa. It is the “right to coordinate” 
hypothesis. 
 
The coordination game between controlling and institutional shareholders on acquisition is 
an iterative process and has a superior equilibrium consistent with players’ cost-benefit analysis. 
Hill and Jones (1992) and Freeman and Evan (1990) place greater emphasis on the process of 
multiple-stakeholder coordination than on the specific agreements and bargains. If and only if all 
controlling and institutional shareholders pursue the same decision of acquisition and monitor 
acquisition jointly, acquisition proposals yield higher returns, but lower returns otherwise. The 
coordination requires inducing everyone to pursue the same strategy. In other words, the 
institutional investors’ gains to acquisition are higher if all alliance partners are coordinated, so 
 
 
12 
 
that there is a “strategic complementarity” (Ball & Romer, 1991). However, these relations are 
often not clearly defined, and coordination games frequently fail in an environment with high 
uncertainty. Large institutions can afford monitoring cost and decrease the uncertainty of 
acquisition. Hence, the coordination of large institutions increases the likelihood and size of 
acquisition and increase post-acquisition performance by monitoring, which would be the superior 
equilibrium for acquisition decision. If there were coordination failures for outsider large 
institutions, positive effect of monitoring on acquisition returns still exist, but will become smaller 
with less acquisition.  
Alternatively, small institutional shareholders can simply trust or reject the controlling 
shareholder’s decisions on the acquisition proposals by using perceptual process or heuristics. 
Institutional investors with small amount stakes cannot afford monitoring costs to influence the 
controlling shareholder and management. Hence, they would better just follow the major 
shareholders and powerful management if they do not want to vote with their feet. This kind of 
coordination also increase acquisition likelihood and size, but without effective monitoring, would 
not increase the acquisition returns. Furthermore, the coordination without monitoring (simply 
trust strategy) may cause the moral hazard problem (Lonsdale, Watson, Sanderson, & Peng, 2014), 
and encourage bad acquisition with low ex-post performance which may be only accordant to the 
interests of controlling shareholder and management. On the contrary, small institutional 
shareholders with a simple rejection strategy cannot increase acquisition returns either, but may 
avoid bad acquisitions.  
Therefore, outsider institutions with large shareholdings clearly benefit from their efforts as 
monitors, as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Maug (1998). Their monitoring efforts 
allow them to make favourable portfolio adjustments such as selling their stakes that are likely to 
make very bad decisions in the year leading up to the actual acquisition. While most of the benefits 
of their monitoring efforts are shared by other investors in the firm, they do reap some private 
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gains from their information. In light of the costs and benefits of monitoring versus trading, only 
insider large institutional investors specialize in providing a coordinated monitoring role and that 
their efforts generate positive externalities to all shareholders of the acquiring PLC. As argued 
above, we have the following propositions:  
 
P1: The insider large institutions prefer monitoring and coordination, so are positively associated 
with corporate acquisition decision and post-acquisition performance.  
P2: The outsider large institutions prefer monitoring and no coordination, so are negatively 
associated with corporate acquisition decision, but positively with post-acquisition performance. 
P3: The insider small institutions prefer trading and coordination, so are positively associated 
with corporate acquisition decision, but negatively associated with post-acquisition performance.  
P4: The outsider small institutions prefer trading and no coordination, so are negatively 
associated with corporate acquisition decision and post-acquisition performance. 
 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 
2.3 Cherry-picking and monitoring  
If some institutions are good at picking and investing in better-managed firms, the observed 
relationship between institutional investment and acquisition could be spurious without any active 
monitoring. The alternative hypothesis is that both institutional presence and acquisitions are 
endogenous, which suggests no cause-effect relationship between institutional investment and the 
likelihood or size of acquisition, leave alone the post-acquisition performance. However, under 
the assumption that all institutions have equal stock-picking ability, we would not expect the 
monitoring effect to be observed only for institutional shareholders with large holdings (Chen, 
Harford, & Li, 2007).  
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Furthermore, we can relax this assumption and assume that some institutional investors 
specialize in identifying and staying invested in better managed firms. If we can still find evidences 
of the relationship between institutional investors and likelihood of withdrawing bad acquisitions 
or supporting good acquisitions even after controlling the corporate finance and governance, an 
active monitoring role of institutional investor is supported rather than a passive stock-picking 
strategy. The fact that the strength of the monitoring effect increases in the split share reform along 
with a general increase in institutional activism is also suggestive of an active monitoring role of 
institutional investor. Based on these arguments, the last hypothesis is summarized as follows: 
  
H6: Institutional monitoring influences on acquisition decision and post-acquisition performance 
beyond the cherry-picking by using public information of corporate finance and governance. It is 
the “right to monitor” hypothesis. 
 
3. Sample formation and empirical strategy 
3.1 Data  
The empirical tests employ the CCER (China Centre for Economic Research) PLC database of 
financial statement, corporate governance and institutional investors. This dataset includes all 
PLCs in the Chinese stock market during the fiscal years 2003-2008. We exclude PLCs subject to 
special treatment (ST, that is, firms reporting two consecutive annual losses) and financial 
institutions (Global Industry Standard Classification between 401010 and 403030) because 
investing and financing activities are ambiguous for these firms. We focus on two samples of 
Chinese PLCs over the period 2003-2008: 1) the acquiring PLCs sample; 2) the full sample, 
including all Chinese PLCs.  
In Table 1, the full sample of Chinese PLCs has 7,458 company-years over the period 2003 
to 2008, while the acquiring PLCs sample has only 2,098 company-years. Hence, the average 
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acquiring proportion is about 28%. The sum of all deals is up to about 793 billion RMB Yuan (￥). 
Furthermore, the pattern of the deal is time varying, with much larger deals and more firm-year 
observations in 2007 (470 PLCs, average annual size about 590 million￥) and 2008 (511 PLCs, 
average annual size 539 million￥) compared to other years. Thus, more and more Chinese PLCs 
are now involved into the acquisition activities, as well as increasing annual acquisition size for 
individual firm. The average annual acquisition size for each acquiring PLCs in 2008 was more 
than 3 folds that in 2003.   
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
    
In terms of industry distribution, the average acquiring proportion is much higher than others 
in Telecommunication Services (36%), Real Estate (34%) and Public utility (31%). We also find 
that the average annual acquisition size occurring in the Chinese PLCs in industries such as 
Telecommunication Services (2 billion￥), Energy (0.82 billion￥) and Real Estate (0.71 billion
￥) are much higher than the average level (0.38 billion￥), while firms in the information 
technology industry have the lowest average annual acquisition size (only 0.11 billion￥). The 
extremely large annual acquisitions of the PLCs do not follow the normal distribution assumption. 
To illustrate the importance of considering the density of acquisition, we display kernel density 
estimators of annual acquisition of the full and acquiring PLCs sample in Figures 2a-f. We obtain 
the kernel density f(a) estimators from observations on annual acquisition by adapting the method 
introduced by Rosenblatt (1956) and Parzen (1962). The kernel density estimates f(a) of a 
univariate density f based on the random sample A1, …, An of size n (2,098 for the acquiring PLCs 
sample and 7,458 for the full sample) is 
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 𝑓ℎ̂(𝑎) =
1
𝑛ℎ
∑ 𝐾(
𝑎−𝐴𝑖
ℎ
)𝑛𝑖=1 .                     (1) 
 
The kernel functions, K used here is Epanechnikov, which is specified and most efficient in 
minimizing the mean integrated squared error. Most researchers agree that the choice of kernel is 
not as important as the choice of bandwidth, h. There is a great deal of literature on choosing 
bandwidths under various conditions (Parzen, 1962; Tapia & Thompson, 1978). Common 
applications typically use a bandwidth h=0.9m/n1/5, where m is min(s, IQR/1.349), s is square root 
of variance of annual acquisition, IQR is the interquartile range of annual acquisition, n is the 
number of observations.  
Figure 2a shows that the density of annual acquisition of all acquiring PLCs is seriously 
skewed by the extremely large cases, which obviously violates the normal distribution assumption. 
The full samples have an even more skewed distribution than the acquiring sample because non-
acquiring PLCs is regarded as 0. In modelling the distributions of annual acquisition size, the 
lognormal distribution has been particularly useful (Aitchison & Brown, 1963). Hence, we 
actually focus on the log form of annual acquisition size. Following Richardson (2006) and Hu, 
Tam, and Tan (2010), a semi-log acquisition function is estimated:  
 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑜𝑝5𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
= 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                𝜀𝑖𝑡 ∽ (0, ơ
2𝐼)                                    (2) 
 
where lnASit is the log form annual acquisition size of PLC i in year t; year dummies (Yeart) capture 
time dynamics; industry dummies (Indj) control industry fixed effects; εit is a random error. We 
examine the relation between annual acquisition size and characteristics of corporate finance 
(Finit), governance (Goverit) and institutional factors (Instit and Top5it) by testing coefficient vector 
β, which are semi-elasticity between annual acquisition size and explanatory covariates.  
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(Insert Figure 2 here) 
 
3.2 Truncated and Censored data 
Figure 2b shows that the density of the acquiring PLCs sample has normal distribution with some 
extremely small values. For example, the bottom 1 percent of the acquiring PLCs sample covers 
the log acquisition interval from 0 to 13.155. We have two strategies for these extremely small 
cases: 
1) Truncated sample: ignoring the bottom 1 percent, about 20 cases, to get a smaller 
truncated sample of 2,078 cases (see Figure 2c). The log form acquisition basically follows the 
normal distribution assumption and can apply the ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimation. And, 
the truncated regression model (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993; Greene, 2012) is applied to the 
truncated acquiring PLCs sample. Hence, given the equation (2): lnASit = Xitβ + εit, the log 
likelihood function for the truncated regression is as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐿 = −
𝑛
2
𝑙𝑜𝑔(2𝜋𝜎2) −
1
2𝜎2
∑ ∑ (𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽)
22008
𝑡=2003
𝑛
𝑖=1 − ∑ ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 {1 − 𝛷(
13.155−𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽
𝜎
)}2008𝑡=2003
𝑛
𝑖=1  (3) 
 
where Φ( ) is the standard cumulative normal distribution. 
2)  Censored sample: replacing all extremely small annual acquisition with the bottom 
percentile value (that is, 13.155) in the acquiring PLCs sample to keep the full 2098 cases, see 
Figure 2d. For the full sample, log form annual acquisition of those non-acquiring PLCs are also 
regarded as 0 (=1 RMB in absolute value), see Figure 2e. And, we can replace all annual 
acquisition less than the bottom percentile value (that is, 13.155) with this value in the full sample 
to have the censored whole sample in Figure 2f. The Tobit model would be applied for the censored 
sample (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Tobin, 1958). The log likelihood function for the Tobit 
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regression is as follows: 
  
𝑙𝑛𝐿 = 𝐷𝑖𝑡 {−
𝑛
2
𝑙𝑜𝑔(2𝜋𝜎2) −
1
2𝜎2
∑ ∑ (𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽)
22008
𝑡=2003
𝑛
𝑖=1 } + (1 − 𝐷𝑖𝑡) ∑ ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 {𝛷 (
13.155−𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽
𝜎
)}2008𝑡=2003
𝑛
𝑖=1  
(4) 
 
where Dit=0 for censored data; and Dit=1 for uncensored data. 
 
3.3 Explanatory variables 
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of log form annual acquisition size (lnAS), corporate finance 
(Fin), corporate governance (Gover), institutional investors (Inst) and TS concentration (Top5) for 
both acquiring and full samples. Corporate financial variables include 7 indicators: sale size, cash 
holding, intangible asset, leverage, capital expenditure, cash dividend and Tobin’s Q ratio. We 
cannot find much difference for these financial indicators between the acquiring and full samples. 
It doesn’t seem that the acquiring PLCs have better financial conditions or more resources than 
those not acquiring, casting doubts on the resource-based views or cherry-picking effects on 
Chinese acquisition.  
The corporate governance variables (Gover) include 7 indicators: board size, board meeting 
times, independent directors, management shareholding, duality of chairman and CEO (separation 
=1; otherwise=0), national ownership (SOEs=1; otherwise=0) and its interaction with duality. 
There is no much difference for these governance indicators between two samples either, except 
that the board directors of the acquiring PLCs work harder with more annual board meetings (9.43 
times) compared with the average (8.32 times). It also suspects the governance-based views that 
only better managed PLCs can acquire assets and stocks in Chinese stock market. Thus, we need 
more explanatory variables and better specification to explore the seemingly random acquisition 
market.      
For institutional variables, we only consider tradable shares owned by institutional investors 
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and top 5 tradable shareholders because they can choose to sell them in the exchange market rather 
than accept the coordination of controlling shareholder and management. Hence, our results are 
comparable with Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) that some institutional investors vote with their 
feet by selling their shares as long as they are not satisfied with the performance of the 
management.  
Currently, there are eleven kinds of investors in the Chinese TS market: 1) QFII; 2) SSF; 3) 
SF; 4) SIF; 5) trust firms; 6) insurance firms; 7) occupational funds; 8) brokers; 9) financial plans; 
10) individuals and 11) others. Among them, we concentrate on the most important four types of 
institutional investors: QFII, SSF, SF and SIF among the top 10 tradable shareholders. In table 2, 
we find that there are much more institutional holdings in the acquiring PLCs than the average. 
And, the TS holdings are more concentrated in the acquiring PLCs (6.54%) than the average 
(3.14%). It could be cherry-picking effect that institutional investors are pursuing Chinese PLCs 
with better financial resource and governance which are more likely to acquire. However, this 
argument is quite implausible because we actually did not find prominent difference of finance 
and governance between two samples. Moreover, QFII (0.96%) and SIF (2.45%) hold much higher 
percentages than SSF (0.14%) and SF (0.29%), so they are more likely to monitor acquisition 
decision. These variables are also applied into truncated equation (3) and censored Tobit model (4) 
to examine the relation between presence of institutional investors and acquisition decision.  
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
3.4 Measures of post-acquisition performance 
Chinese PLCs are increasingly using acquisitions as a vehicle to obtain knowledge or strategic 
assets, so as to enhance their competitive advantage and performance (Deng, 2012, 2013). The 
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets (ROA) is often used as a measure of 
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operating performance. We then estimate a difference model using the post-acquisition ROA as 
the left-hand-side variable (DROA), with the responding measures in acquiring year as the right-
hand-side variables. The other measure of the quality of the acquisition is the change in the 
earnings per share after the acquisition event (DEPS). The change in earnings forecast (DEPS) is 
calculated as the difference between the acquisition completion and the period before acquisition.  
 
DROAit=α0+α1QFIIit+α2SSFit+α3SFit+α4SIFit+α5TOP5it+μit            (5a) 
 
DEPSit=β0+β1QFIIit+β2SSFit+β3SFit+β4SIFit+β5TOP5it+εit             (5b) 
 
3.5 Cherry picking effect  
Institutional investors may buy more stocks of Chinese PLCs with better financial performance 
and institutional governance. According to resource and governance-based views, these PLCs 
could have higher likelihood to acquire assets and stock and achieve larger-sized deals.3 This 
cherry-picking effect may bring a spurious relationship in above specification between 
institutional investment and acquisition decision. Even though we find contrary evidences in the 
descriptive statistics in Table 2, we still need more sensitivity tests to disentangle the institutional 
monitoring effect from the cherry picking process.  
If institution variables are highly correlated with finance and governance variables, institution 
variables may have significantly positive coefficients by getting the positive effects from finance 
and governance variables. As pointed out by Kennedy (2003), the more collinear two or more 
regressors are, the more likely it is that they share the significant non-zero effect on the dependent 
variable. To exclude the possible cherry-picking biases from the estimated monitoring effect of 
                                                             
3 Bushee, Carter, and Gerakos (2004) show that institutions prefer to invest in firms with good board governance. 
Better boards can be expected to make better acquisition decisions. 
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institutional investment, we use the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell (FWL) 2-Step model (Frisch & Waugh, 
1933; Lovell, 1963) to test the sensitivity of our results. In step 1, we regress log form acquisition 
on financial and governance variables, but without institutional variables and get the residual 
errors, δit:  
 
lnASit=α0+α1Finit+α2Goverit+α3Yeart+α4Indj+δit             (6a) 
 
And then, we continue regressing the institutional variables on financial and governance 
variables individually and get the residual error μ1it-μ5it: 
 
 QFII =α10+α11Finit+α12Goverit+α13Yeart+α14Indj +μ1it 
 SSF =α20+α21Finit+α22Goverit+α23Yeart+α24Indj +μ2it 
SF =α30+α31Finit+α32Goverit+α33Yeart+α34Indj +μ3it 
       SIF =α40+α41Finit+α42Goverit+α43Yeart+α44Indj +μ4it 
              TOP5 =α50+α51Finit+α52Goverit+α53Yeart+α54Indj +μ5it       (6b) 
 
In the Step 2, we regress the estimation of residual errors of equation (6a) on estimation of 
residual errors of equations (6b). The coefficients βs are semi-elasticity between annual acquisition 
size and institutional explanatory covariates, excluding the cherry-picking effects from finance 
and governance. 
 
𝛿𝑖?̂? = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜇1𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝛽2𝜇2𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝛽3𝜇3𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝛽4𝜇4𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝛽5𝜇5𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                 (6c) 
 
4. Empirical Results 
We adopt different methods to examine the sensitivity of data sample and hypotheses. Six different 
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specifications are established to quantify equations (2)-(4). All specifications include year and 
industry dummies. Columns 1-3 in Table 3 present the very similar estimation results of original, 
truncated and censored acquiring sample using OLS, truncated regression and Tobit model.  
In details, variables of cash holding, leverage and Tobin’s Q are significantly positively 
associated with annual acquisition size as expected. Capital expenditure of Chinese PLCs is also 
significantly positively associated with annual acquisition size, maybe as complementary 
investment for acquisition. No significant association is found between sales and annual 
acquisition size. It suggests that firm size is not so important as cash resources for acquisition 
decision in the Chinese PLCs. Cash dividend pay-out has no significant effect on acquisition size 
either, which is consistent with the fact that the Chinese PLCs have no constraints of cash dividend 
and do not take cash dividend into account when they make the acquisition decision. Chinese 
PLCs with more intangible assets, possibly being traditional companies with long history and 
famous brands, are more cautious to acquisition. Thus, regression estimation can detect subtle 
evidences of resource-based view unidentified in simple description of Table 2. Chinese PLCs 
with more financial resources can acquire more assets and stocks. 
Moreover, board size and annual board meeting times as measures of corporate governance 
are found to be significantly positively related to annual acquisition size. The portion of 
independent directors in board is insignificant, casting doubts on their functioning. These results 
confirm findings in literature that bigger board may bring more irresponsible acquisition while 
independent directors could not alleviate this problem.  
 
H1 right to manage  
Next, we will focus on hypothesis testing. H1 tries to test the relationship between ownership 
structure and completed acquisition size. From above results, we find the completed acquisition 
size is really contingent on corporate finance and governance. State Owned Enterprises are 
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supposed to acquire more because of the external driving forces exercised by the Chinese 
government at different levels (Deng, 2012, 2013). However, for the ex post acquisition size, we 
did not find evidence for this argument. The insignificant coefficient of national ownership 
variable suggests that whether the largest shareholder is stated owned or not has no significant 
impact on annual acquisition size. The institutional shareholders and top 5 TS concentration are 
insignificant either, except that the QFII in the Tobit model encourage firm’s annual acquisition 
size. These results are consistent with our Hypothesis 1 that annual acquisition size should be 
unrelated with ownership structure because the acquisition market offers are random with high 
uncertainty. It will be the management’s right to match the actual market offers with the firm’s 
effective demand after the acquisition decision is made by the board.  
 
H2 right to supervise  
Management holding can decrease the acquisition size, maybe through alleviating the agency 
problem of management’s overconfident acquisition matching. The separation of board chairman 
and CEO obviously provide better monitoring on acquisition as expected. As Hypothesis 2 
predicts, board supervision on management such as giving shares to executives or separation of 
CEO and chairman of board, shows a good monitoring effect and makes acquisition more cautious. 
We also design an interaction term by multiplying national ownership and departed CEO and 
Chairman. No significant coefficient is found for this interacted variable. 
Column 4-6 present the results of OLS and Tobit model with original and censored full 
samples. Institutional shareholders now have significant effect on acquisition decision. Since we 
know from H1 that there is no significant association between institutional shareholders and the 
completed acquisition size in the acquiring PLCs sample, these significant effects in the full 
sample must be from the ex-ante acquisition decision on whether the PLC should acquire, rather 
than the ex-post acquisition decision on how much to acquire. The difference between the 
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acquiring PLCs sample and full sample reflects the difference between “right to manage” and 
“right to supervise”, and separation of management and ownership. Hence, outsider institutions 
of QFII and SF make the acquisition more cautious, while insider institutions of SSF and SIF 
encourage acquisition happening. Moreover, management holding and CEO-Chairman separation 
are the effective supervision on management’s enforcement of acquisition, but obviously have no 
significant effect on likelihood of acquisition. At the same time, independent directors cannot 
affect the annual acquisition size in the acquiring PLCs sample, but they can make the acquisition 
decision more cautious in the full sample. It is also evidence of the separation of management and 
ownership in a highly uncertain acquisition market.     
 
H3 right to ally  
Table 3 also shows that the concentration of ownership is irrelevant to annual acquisition size in 
the acquiring PLCs sample, but it is significantly positively associated with the acquisition in the 
full sample. The more concentrated is the ownership structure, the more likely for the major 
shareholder(s) and management to ally and make overconfident acquisition decision in their 
interests. Hence, we find that the Top 5 TS concentration is significantly positively associated with 
likelihood of acquisition, being consistent with the “right to ally” hypothesis. However, strategic 
alliance between major shareholder(s) and management may endorse the acquisition proposals 
concordant with their joint interest but damaging interests of institutional and minor shareholders, 
which could cause serious principle-principle conflicts. We need check the post-acquisition 
performance to see the consequences of the overconfident acquisitions of allied decision makers.    
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
Table 4 uses the bottom 10% and quarter of DROA and DEPS to measure bad post-
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acquisition performance, as well as the top 10% and quarter of DROA and DEPS to measure good 
post-acquisition performance. We find that the concentration of the top 5 TS shareholders is 
significantly positively associated with bad performance, but significantly negatively associated 
with good performance. These are evidences of collusion between the major shareholder(s) and 
management. This kind of overconfidence decreases efficiency and returns of acquisitions. The 
concentration of the top 5 TS is significantly associated with more bad acquisitions and less good 
acquisitions. When institutional investors are large enough to attend the board, they are also likely 
to join the ally or be coordinated.  
  
H4 right to choose  
In Table 4, the institutional investors show different monitoring effect on post-acquisition 
performance. QFII and SIF have large stakes (see Table 2) and would increase the post-acquisition 
performance by monitoring the acquisition decision. The Probit regression shows that QFII can 
increase the likelihood of achieving the top 10% highest acquisition returns measured as both 
DROA (0.0375) and DEPS (0.0311), and also significantly positively associated with achieving 
top quarter highest acquisition returns (DROA, 0.0231). SIF with large stakes can increase the 
likelihood of the good acquisitions (0.0445 for top 10% DEPS, 0.0580 for top quarter DEPS), as 
well as avoid the bad acquisitions (-0.0644 for bottom 10% DROA, -0.026 for bottom quarter 
DROA).  
Institutions with fewer stakes such as SSF and SF could prefer trading and have no much 
significant effect on the post-acquisition performance. SSF have the least stake holding (see Table 
2) in Chinese PLCs and have even higher likelihood to have extremely bad acquisitions (0.1919 
for bottom 10% DROA). SF have comparably more stake holding than SSF and can have higher 
likelihood to have moderate good acquisition (0.0302 for top quartile DROA). These results are 
consistent with H4 that institutions with large stakes could increase the post-acquisition 
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performance through monitoring, while institutions with small stakes prefer trading and could 
have less positive effect on the post-acquisition performance. Different institutional investors 
choose a balance point between the monitoring and trading.   
  
H5 right to coordinate  
QFII are owned by foreign investors who have large stakes but have no other interdependent 
business relationship with the PLC. SF is mainly private-owned and independent from the business 
scope of the Chinese PLC. Consequently, these two institutional shareholders are regarded as 
outsider institutions in China and difficult to coordinate, because about 70% of the controlling 
shareholders of Chinese PLCs are SOEs (see Table 2). We can find a significantly negative 
association between outsider shareholders and acquisition in Table 3. QFII and SF are more likely 
to reject the annual acquisition proposal and fail the coordination. In literature, SSF and SIF are 
independent institutions, but they are insider instiutions in China because these two institutions 
are also SOEs just as most controlling shareholders. Hence, SSF and SIF are more likely than QFII 
and SF to be coordinated with the controlling shareholder and management. There is a positive 
association between SSF/SIF and acquisition in Table 3.  
 
Propositions 1-4  
Combining results in Table 3 and 4, we can test Propositions 1-4. According to the Securities 
Investment Fund Law of P.R.C 2003, SIF have been always founded by the public-owned banks 
in China, which have other business links with the PLCs they invested. Hence, SIF are insider 
institutions with large stakes. We find a positive association between SIF and acquisition decision, 
and better post-acquisition performance. As large institutions, SIF would monitor the acquisition 
and share the benefits with other shareholders. These monitoring efforts can effectively alleviate 
the opportunism of the controlling shareholder and management, and increase the acquisition 
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returns. Hence, the monitoring effort of SIF can influence the controlling shareholder and 
management and finally achieve coordination within the board. This superior equilibrium is the 
optimal result in which efficient acquisition is encouraged.  
China’s SSF were founded in early years of the 2000s and also public-owned, according to 
the National Social Security Funds Investment Management Interim Regulation in 2001. SSF were 
insider institutional shareholders because of their national ownership. SSF, as free riders have to 
trust their alliances in the board on acquisition decision, because they are too small during our 
period to monitor the acquisition. SSF’s trading strategy can have cost advantage of free insider 
information on acquisition decision. However, this kind of trust without monitoring encourages 
over-confidence and opportunism in the acquisition decision of the PLCs and will decrease the 
post-acquisition performance. Thus, we find positive association between SSF and acquisition 
decision, and insignificant or even negative association between SSF and post-acquisition 
performance. 
The outsider large institutions like QFII prefer monitoring and share benefits with other 
shareholders. Their monitoring effort can improve acquisition quality, but their independent status 
lacks of the necessary business channels to communicate with the controlling shareholder and 
management. Coordination failure makes the acquisition decision too cautious. According to the 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors Investment Management Interim Regulation in 2002, the 
first QFII were founded in 2003. There is negative association between QFII and acquisition 
decision, and positive association with post-acquisition performance. Hence, QFII decrease the 
likelihood of acquisition, but can grasp the best acquisitions. SF have been the oldest institutional 
investors in China since the 1990s. The main revenues of SF are actually from the service of 
transaction rather than investment into PLCs. Hence, these outsider small institutions prefer 
trading strategy. Their independent businesses have no extra links with the PLC, so also difficult 
to be coordinated. SF can help more cautious acquisition decision. However, they cannot help 
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improve acquisition efficiency. The association between SF and post-acquisition performance 
should be insignificant. 
 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
H6 right to monitor  
While our results suggest that institutional shareholders with large stakes actively monitor 
management and get better post-acquisition performance, we cannot completely rule out the 
possibility that our results are due to endogeneity or other causes for a spurious correlation 
between good post-acquisition performance and concentrated holdings. The most likely 
alternative explanation is that institutions are good at picking and investing in better-managed 
firms, leading to the observed relation without any active monitoring. Considering Chinese 
institutional investment has been existent and fast growing only since 2003, their development 
and activism were accompanied with the split share reform which was exogenous dynamic process 
for our study. Thus, our data covering the specific reform period can provide a natural societal 
experiment to test the applicability of existing theories of institutional monitoring on the 
acquisition decision.  
Further, we discuss results from additional tests below that increase our confidence in the 
monitoring hypothesis. In Table 5a, the first step of the FWL model is applied to the acquiring 
PLCs sample to exclude the effect of public information of corporate finance and governance. We 
can find the institutional variables are mainly correlated with financial variables. Only QFII and 
the concentration of the top 5 TS shareholding are significantly positively associated with board 
size, meeting times and independent director ratios. SSF are significantly positively associated 
with board size. The characteristics of corporate finance and governance could affect annual 
acquisition size and institutional investment simultaneously. However, when we use the second 
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step of the FWL model to regress the residual annual acquisition size on residual institutional 
variables, insignificant results still hold. It suggests that our conclusion on the “right to manage” 
hypothesis is robust after we controlled the corporate financial and governance in the completed 
acquisition. 
We also apply this test in the full sample. The significant effects of institutional investors 
still hold in the residual regressions. QFII and SF are still negative to acquisition decision, while 
SSF, SIF and Top5 still positive. It suggests that our conclusion on the “right to supervise” and 
“right to ally” hypotheses are robust after we controlled the corporate financial and governance in 
the full sample. Institutional investors monitor further information on acquisition to help choose 
different coordination strategy. Hence, institutional shareholder could make influence on 
acquisition decision even after corporate finance and governance are controlled.  
We do not need test the post-acquisition performance since we have done the differencing 
of financial performance in Table 4. Those fixed components of corporate financial and 
governance over time have been controlled. Under the assumption that all institutions have equal 
stock-picking ability, we would not expect the monitoring effect to be only observed for all 
institutional investors with large holdings such as SIF and QFII, and not for SSF and SF. 
Furthermore, we can relax this assumption and assume that SIF and QFII specialize in identifying 
and staying invested in better-governed firms. However, SIF is coordinated with the acquisition 
proposal and can help avoid bad deals or get better deals, in contrast to QFII’s coordination failures 
but still strive to get better acquisition. We believe that the results from Table 3, 4 and 5a-b suggest 
an active monitoring role of these large institutional shareholders rather than a passive, stock-
picking strategy. The “right to monitor” and “right to coordinate” remains even if we control for 
finance and governance as determinants of institutional holdings.  
 
(Insert Table 5a-b here) 
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
There have been few studies of merger and acquisition in China (Peng, 2006), and even more scare 
are the studies of the institutional activism on acquisition decision. Although institutional investors 
in China have formed a powerful party in the board of most Chinese PLCs (Zeng, Yuan, & Zhang, 
2011), this increasing dominance in the equity market contrasts with our limited understanding of 
the roles that institutional investors play in corporate governance. The extant literatures mention 
little about the monitoring function of institutional investors in the Chinese PLCs’ acquisition. 
With recent available data of the Chinese stock market, we find evidence that large institutional 
investors such as SIF and QFII more likely monitor the acquisition and make influence on the 
controlling shareholder and management, while other small investors such as SSF and SF would 
rather choose trading as a priority strategy.  
The results in our study depict an intuitive cost-benefit analysis on institutional monitoring 
versus trading: when monitoring benefits exceed costs, institutional investors would monitor 
rather than trading. Their monitoring activities may improve the efficiency of searching and 
matching in the acquisition market and share the benefit with other stakeholders. Our evidence on 
the relation between institutional holdings and acquisition efficiency shows that monitoring of 
institutional shareholders (such as SIF and QFII) can grasp good acquisitions and avoid bad 
acquisitions. Thus, these institutions are active in influencing management’s decision to reverse a 
bad decision. 
This paper also sheds new light into the coordination process of acquisition decision in an 
emerging market like China. Interdependence between institutions and the Chinese PLC, or its 
controlling shareholder and management, determines whether they are coordinated with the joint 
acquisition proposals of the controlling shareholder and management. Outsider institutions such 
as QFII and SF more likely fail in coordination, while insider institutions such as SIF and SSF are 
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more willing to cooperate and encourage the corporate acquisition. Thus, the (un)successful 
coordination can (restrict) broaden the effect of monitoring and trading. 
Our research provides a unique societal experiment on the monitoring effect of institutional 
investment as well as the shareholding structure on a Chinese PLC’s acquisition decision and its 
post-acquisition performance. However, because of data limitation, detailed information of the 
monitoring and coordination process of institutional investors, such as board voting results are 
unavailable. While we postulate a strategic alliance model between the controlling shareholder 
and management, institutional investors have developed from nothing to powerful bargaining 
parties in corporate management since the split share structure reform in 2005. More accurate 
conceptual models and empirical investigation should be done in future research, and will 
continuously induce great interest of both academia and practitioners in China and the greater 
world.  
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Table 1: Annual acquisition of Chinese PLCs by industry, 2003-2008 
 
Year/Industry PLCs 
number 
Acquiring 
PLCs 
number 
Acquiring 
PLCs  
(%) 
Total 
acquisition   
(Million￥) 
Average 
acquisition  
(Million￥) 
2003 1,073 298 28 50,747 170 
2004 1,167 294 25 75,640 257 
2005 1,180 236 20 35,952 152 
2006 1,259 289 23 77,959 270 
2007 1,362 470 35 277,219 590 
2008 1,417 511 36 275,378 539 
Average 1,243 350 28 132,149 378 
Total 7,458 2,098  792,895  
Energy 218 61 28 50,248 824 
Raw materials 1,497 390 26 171,909 441 
Industrials 1,549 424 27 213,981 505 
Non-daily consumption 1,526 453 30 87,823 194 
Daily Consumptions 514 144 28 19,604 136 
Medical and health care 532 158 30 27,113 172 
Real Estate 572 192 34 136,772 712 
Information Technology 672 157 23 16,911 108 
Telecommunication Services 14 5 36 10,040 2,008 
Public utility 364 114 31 58,495 513 
Average 746 210 28 79,290 378 
Total 7,458 2,098  792,895  
 
Data source: the CCER PLC database 2003-2008. 
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Table 2a Variable Statistics Description, Acquiring sample (Obv N =2,098) 
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Log Acquisition Scale 17.87 2.02 0.00 24.48 
Log Sales 18.36 6.93 0.00 27.67 
Log Cash 19.47 1.43 0.00 24.55 
Log Intangible Asset 16.50 4.65 0.00 23.88 
Leverage 0.50 0.18 0.00 1.90 
Log Capital Expenditure 18.36 1.83 8.71 26.13 
Cash Dividend 0.09 0.14 0.00 3.00 
Tobin’s Q 1.71 0.99 0.15 4.59 
Board Size 6.31 1.64 2.00 17.00 
Meeting times 9.43 3.80 1.00 36.00 
Independent Director  55.25 13.17 0.00 100.00 
Management holding 3.32 8.95 0.00 78.38 
Duality 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 
National Owner 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
National owner *Duality 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
QFII† 0.96 4.88 0.00 45.64 
SSF 0.14 0.45 0.00 6.26 
SF 0.29 1.78 0.00 58.37 
SIF 2.45 4.06 0.00 29.08 
TOP5 6.54 7.83 0.05 58.74 
 
Data source: the CCER PLC database 2003-2008.  
†Institutional shareholders (QFII, SSF, SF and SIF) and top 5 TS shareholders (TOP5) are 
weighted proportions of total shares (including NTS and TS) using total assets of PLCs as 
weights.  
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Table 2b Variable Statistics Description, Full sample (Obv N=7,458) 
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Log Acquisition Scale†† 5.03 8.10 0.00 24.48 
Log Sales 18.57 6.45 0.00 27.67 
Log Cash 19.27 1.46 0.00 25.21 
Log Intangible Asset 15.98 5.01 0.00 23.89 
Leverage 0.50 0.40 0.00 16.33 
Log Capital Expenditure 18.08 1.85 8.58 26.13 
Cash Dividend 0.08 0.13 0.00 3.00 
Tobin’s Q 1.78 1.08 0.15 8.05 
Board Size 6.32 1.62 1.00 19.00 
Meeting times 8.32 3.45 1.00 36.00 
Independent Director  55.05 13.29 0.00 100.00 
Management holding 3.41 9.85 0.00 95.05 
Duality 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 
National Owner 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 
National owner *Duality 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 
QFII 0.39 3.08 0.00 45.64 
SSF 0.06 0.29 0.00 6.26 
SF 0.15 1.36 0.00 58.37 
SIF 1.04 2.83 0.00 29.08 
TOP5 3.14 6.24 0.05 60.10 
 
Data source: the CCER PLC database 2003-2008.  
†† Log form acquisition size is regarded as 0 (lnAS=0) for non-acquiring PLCs. 
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Table 3: Regression analysis of annual acquisition size, Chinese PLCs 2003-2008 
 
Dependent variable= 
log form annual 
acquisition size 
(1)  
Acquiring 
Sample 
(2) 
Truncated Acquiring 
Sample 
(3)  
Censored Acquiring 
Sample 
(4)  
Full 
Sample 
(5)  
Full 
Sample 
(6)  
Censored Full 
Sample 
OLS TRUNCAT TOBIT OLS TOBIT TOBIT 
Log sale 0.0019 -0.0056 0.0005 0.0283* 0.0974** 0.0301** 
(0.0063) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0145) (0.0495) (0.0138) 
Log cash holding 
 
0.1550*** 0.1749*** 0.1592*** 0.0325 -0.0238 0.0420 
(0.0340) (0.0310) (0.0302) (0.0715) (0.2516) (0.0707) 
Log intangible 
asset 
-0.0224** -0.0166** -0.0189** 0.0327* 0.1451** 0.0346* 
(0.0095) (0.0083) (0.0085) (0.0182) (0.0667) (0.0186) 
Leverage 
 
0.4158* 0.2738 0.3261 -0.1566 -1.4280 -0.2896 
(0.2416) (0.2117) (0.2145) (0.2191) (1.1727) (0.3192) 
Log capital 
expenditure 
0.2228*** 0.2017*** 0.2090*** 0.2737*** 0.8621*** 0.3029*** 
(0.0292) (0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0599) (0.2128) (0.0597) 
Cash dividend 
 
0.4065 0.3615 0.3671 -1.3953** -5.3338** -1.3687** 
(0.3111) (0.2710) (0.2762) (0.6832) (2.4075) (0.6709) 
Tobin’s Q 
 
0.1428*** 0.1214*** 0.1273*** -0.1649* -0.7259** -0.1525* 
(0.0429) (0.0374) (0.0381) (0.0847) (0.3080) (0.0860) 
Board size 
 
0.0676** 0.0624** 0.0645** -0.1135* -0.4316** -0.0977 
(0.0293) (0.0255) (0.0260) (0.0624) (0.2188) (0.0611) 
Meeting times 
 
0.0564*** 0.0476*** 0.0513*** 0.2987*** 0.9512*** 0.2799*** 
(0.0116) (0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0267) (0.0890) (0.0249) 
Independent 
Director % 
0.0054 0.0036 0.0043 -0.0133* -0.0520* -0.0126* 
(0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0075) (0.0266) (0.0074) 
Management 
holding 
-0.0211*** -0.0173*** -0.0183*** 0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0062 
(0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0094) (0.0343) (0.0097) 
Duality 
 
-0.4023* -0.4007** -0.3662* -0.4131 -0.8284 -0.3604 
(0.2219) (0.1941) (0.1970) (0.4987) (1.7025) (0.4768) 
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National owned 
 
-0.0362 -0.0215 -0.0280 -0.8488 -2.7015 -0.7493 
(0.2671) (0.2336) (0.2372) (0.5835) (2.0132) (0.5632) 
National*duality 
 
0.0871 0.0886 0.0875 0.1040 0.0704 0.0612 
(0.2785) (0.2436) (0.2473) (0.6086) (2.1014) (0.5880) 
QFII 0.0176 0.0163 0.0182* -0.0805** -0.4138*** -0.0913*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0362) (0.1071) (0.0298) 
SSF -0.1121 0.0131 -0.0415 0.8604*** 2.0888** 0.5707** 
 (0.1000) (0.0875) (0.0888) (0.3234) (0.9366) (0.2611) 
SF 0.0014 0.0053 0.0034 -0.1003 -0.3239* -0.0861 
 (0.0246) (0.0213) (0.0218) (0.0675) (0.1979) (0.0552) 
SIF 0.0150 0.0175 0.0149 0.4705*** 1.0875*** 0.3093*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0397) (0.1174) (0.0327) 
Top5 0.0064 0.0053 0.0053 0.3523*** 1.0523*** 0.2879*** 
 (0.0089) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0221) (0.0700) (0.0196) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2098 2078 2098 7458 7458 7458 
 
Notes: The corresponding estimates of standard errors are reported below each coefficient. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Institutional investors benefit from acquisition, equation 5a-b 
 
PROBIT 
DROA 
 (<=10%) 
DROA 
(>=90%) 
DEPS  
(<=10%) 
DEPS 
(>=90%) 
QFII -0.0049 0.0378*** -0.0100 0.0311*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0117) (0.0107) (0.0110)    
SSF 0.1919* 0.1028 0.1126 0.1090    
 (0.1020) (0.0851) (0.0915) (0.0757)    
SF -0.0353 -0.1042 -0.0337 -0.0475    
 (0.0447) (0.0768) (0.0462) (0.0671)    
SIF -0.0644*** 0.0107 -0.0119 0.0445*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0106)    
Top5 0.0140* -0.0455*** 0.0121 -0.0297*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0098) (0.0075) (0.0092)    
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2098 2098 2098 2098    
PROBIT 
DROA 
(<=25%) 
DROA 
(>=75%) 
DEPS 
 (<25%) 
DEPS 
(>=75%) 
QFII 0.0001 0.0231** 0.0064 0.0089    
 (0.0087) (0.0091) (0.0088) (0.0085)    
SSF 0.0311 0.0037 0.0492 0.0522    
 (0.0813) (0.0723) (0.0794) (0.0707)    
SF 0.0064 0.0302* 0.0217 0.0156    
 (0.0164) (0.0172) (0.0165) (0.0171)    
SIF -0.0260** 0.0302*** -0.0109 0.0580*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0092) (0.0099) (0.0092)    
Top5 0.0122* -0.0256*** 0.0017 0.0009    
 (0.0066) (0.0071) (0.0067) (0.0065)    
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2098 2098 2098 2098    
 
Notes: The corresponding estimates of standard errors are reported below each coefficient. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 5a: Regression analysis on acquisition scale, acquiring sample, Frisch-Waugh-Lovell model 
 
Step 1 regression with industry and year dummies 
 LnAS QFII SSF SF SIF Top5 
Log sale 0.0009 -0.0665*** -0.0014 0.0045 0.0196 -0.0552** 
 (0.0063) (0.0156) (0.0015) (0.0060) (0.0125) (0.0225) 
Log cash holding 0.1677*** 0.4002*** 0.0288*** 0.0461 0.2858*** 0.7087*** 
 (0.0336) (0.0837) (0.0080) (0.0323) (0.0671) (0.1211) 
Log intangible 
asset 
-0.0213** 0.0598** -0.0008 0.0020 -0.0196 0.0294 
(0.0095) (0.0237) (0.0023) (0.0092) (0.0190) (0.0344) 
Leverage 0.3847 -2.0726*** 0.0211 -0.0752 1.0485** -1.2250 
 (0.2410) (0.6005) (0.0572) (0.2319) (0.4813) (0.8686) 
Log capital 
expenditure 
0.2373*** 0.5134*** 0.0151** 0.0277 0.2088*** 0.6203*** 
(0.0287) (0.0716) (0.0068) (0.0276) (0.0574) (0.1035) 
Cash dividend 0.4774 -0.6311 0.1385* 0.0167 5.1602*** 3.1529*** 
 (0.3060) (0.7625) (0.0727) (0.2945) (0.6112) (1.1030) 
Tobin’s Q 0.1413*** 0.0521 0.0033 0.0286 -0.0404 -0.2208 
 (0.0429) (0.1069) (0.0102) (0.0413) (0.0857) (0.1546) 
Board size 0.0709** 0.1854** 0.0139** -0.0221 0.0143 0.2127** 
 (0.0292) (0.0729) (0.0069) (0.0281) (0.0584) (0.1054) 
Meeting times 0.0581*** 0.0711** 0.0038 0.0130 0.0205 0.0793* 
 (0.0116) (0.0288) (0.0027) (0.0111) (0.0231) (0.0417) 
Independent 
Director % 
0.0060* 0.0212** 0.0002 -0.0042 0.0035 0.0256** 
(0.0036) (0.0089) (0.0009) (0.0034) (0.0072) (0.0129) 
Management 
holding 
-0.0214*** -0.0038 0.0011 -0.0014 0.0028 -0.0202 
(0.0048) (0.0120) (0.0011) (0.0047) (0.0097) (0.0174) 
Duality -0.4069* -0.4352 0.0007 -0.0484 0.3686 -0.3600 
 (0.2221) (0.5533) (0.0527) (0.2137) (0.4435) (0.8004) 
National owned -0.0424 -0.2543 -0.0054 -0.0905 0.2886 -1.0269 
 (0.2673) (0.6660) (0.0635) (0.2572) (0.5338) (0.9634) 
National*duality 0.1083 0.9132 -0.0106 0.2071 -0.2896 1.2634 
 (0.2787) (0.6944) (0.0662) (0.2682) (0.5566) (1.0044) 
R-squared 0.171 0.120 0.056 0.011 0.185 0.286 
N 2098 2098 2098 2098 2098 2098 
Step 2 regression of residuals 
Dependent variable 
= log form annual 
acquisition size 
QFII SSF SF SIF Top5 
0.0176 -0.1121 0.0014 0.0150 0.0064 
(0.0121) (0.0993) (0.0244) (0.0128) (0.0089) 
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Table 5b: Regression analysis on acquisition scale, full sample, Frisch-Waugh-Lovell model 
 
Step 1 regression with industry and year dummies 
 LnAS QFII SSF SF SIF Top5 
Log sale 0.0364** -0.0265*** 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0128** -0.0014 
 (0.0154) (0.0059) (0.0006) (0.0027) (0.0052) (0.0112) 
Log cash holding 0.2085*** 0.1534*** 0.0130*** 0.0433*** 0.1531*** 0.3106*** 
 (0.0760) (0.0292) (0.0028) (0.0132) (0.0258) (0.0551) 
Log intangible 
asset 
0.0431** 0.0170** -0.0003 0.0019 0.0028 0.0310** 
(0.0194) (0.0075) (0.0007) (0.0034) (0.0066) (0.0141) 
Leverage 0.0234 0.0081 0.0102 0.0084 0.1693** 0.2642 
 (0.2338) (0.0899) (0.0087) (0.0406) (0.0794) (0.1696) 
Log capital 
expenditure 
0.4384*** 0.1924*** 0.0083*** 0.0107 0.1240*** 0.3288*** 
(0.0635) (0.0244) (0.0024) (0.0110) (0.0216) (0.0461) 
Cash dividend 0.0164 -0.3835 0.0652** -0.1862 2.4965*** 0.3733 
 (0.7236) (0.2783) (0.0268) (0.1255) (0.2458) (0.5247) 
Tobin’s Q -0.2415*** 0.0052 -0.0060* -0.0003 -0.0619** -0.1188* 
 (0.0904) (0.0348) (0.0033) (0.0157) (0.0307) (0.0655) 
Board size -0.0774 0.0969*** 0.0029 -0.0184 0.0002 0.1122** 
 (0.0666) (0.0256) (0.0025) (0.0115) (0.0226) (0.0483) 
Meeting times 0.4085*** 0.0630*** 0.0057*** 0.0101** 0.0801*** 0.2080*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0109) (0.0010) (0.0049) (0.0096) (0.0205) 
Independent 
Director % 
-0.0136* 0.0081*** -0.0002 -0.0028** -0.0016 0.0031 
(0.0080) (0.0031) (0.0003) (0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0058) 
Management 
holding 
-0.0133 -0.0010 -0.0000 -0.0016 -0.0063* -0.0314*** 
(0.0100) (0.0039) (0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0034) (0.0073) 
Duality -0.3240 -0.1792 -0.0044 0.0161 0.1225 0.0638 
 (0.5325) (0.2048) (0.0197) (0.0923) (0.1809) (0.3861) 
National owned -1.0794* -0.0340 -0.0203 -0.0090 -0.0765 -0.5132 
 (0.6230) (0.2396) (0.0231) (0.1080) (0.2116) (0.4518) 
National*duality 0.1731 0.3116 0.0110 0.0620 0.0182 0.2340 
 (0.6498) (0.2499) (0.0240) (0.1127) (0.2208) (0.4712) 
R-squared 0.070 0.047 0.033 0.009 0.122 0.175 
N 7458 7458 7458 7458 7458 7458 
Step 2 regression of residuals 
Dependent variable= 
log form annual 
acquisition size 
QFII SSF SF SIF Top5 
-0.0805** 0.8604*** -0.1003 0.4705*** 0.3523*** 
(0.0361) (0.3228) (0.0674) (0.0397) (0.0221) 
 
Notes: The corresponding estimates of standard errors are reported below each coefficient. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 1 Acquisition decision process and post-acquisition performance 
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Figure 2 The truncated and censored data of annual acquisition size, Chinese PLCs 2003-2008 
 
 
Data source: the CCER PLC database 2003-2008. 
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